The Byronic
Thing:
Don Juan
, or
Timothy Feng-shan Tsai
-- Shakespeare, Richard II, I.iv
|
1. |
As Don Juan is a poem so is Byron a poet of the thing. Rather than a symbol of permanence, the thing is destablized by the frequent occurrence of the word "thing" whose semantic aspects are, to say the least, mercurial. What is commonly called Byron's mobility depends almost exclusively on the mutability of the thing which is thematized by the poem's self-image as "A non-descript and ever varying rhyme, / A versified Aurora Borealis."{1} The truth of the matter is that the poem is not only versified, it is also diversified. One can without exaggeration call the poem a detour de force . In the turn and return of its rhymes , the equivocation of the Byronic thing facilitates, on the ond hand, the liberty and license the poem takes and, on the other, the licentiousness and libertinism that are the earmark of the Don Juan tradition. To the extent that, besides liberty and license, the poem also takes a linguistic turn, licentiousness and libertinism are given an ironic twist, so much so that Byronic thing appears in a quixotic (dis-)guise, drifting along a quick succession of discursive and sexual digressions. In terms of the latter, however, the poem as a versified aurora borealis encounters an impasse vis-a-vis the narcissistic and immobile Aurora Raby. Characterized as an orphan (15:44), she leads the poem to a literal dead end in the form of a fragment, which opens with a reflection on orphans (17:1), quickly deflects into a defence of paradox (17:6), and winds up pinning a hope on a firm Post Obit on posterity (17:9). With the death of the author, the poem that concludes with a fragment on orphans is literally left an orphan, and a "sterile orphan"{2} at that, compelled to adopt asexual modes of reproduction such as, to name only a few, the auto-production of subject-work, doubling by specular reflection, proliferation by self-division, and the reproduction of posterity effect by the issue of speculative post-obits. Insofar as the Don Juan tradition is a relay of representation, it is fit to see how Jacques Lacan's exposition -- both explication and exhibition -- of Don Juan as a compulsive type of male sexuality fits into that genealogy. In so doing, it is not so much to read Byron with Lacan as to read Lacan with Byron. Without wishing to fully delineate the Byronic thing, however, I hope that, by tracing its detours, one can nevertheless perceive its contours.
|
2. |
One of the difficulties one
encounters in thinking about Byron's
Don Juan
is the promiscuous way in which the
word "thing" is used. It is not simply that its usages exhaust all possible
meanings which a capable dictionary can nevertheless manage to stabilize, nor that it
floats as a signifier along the seemingly endless divagation of the
ottava rima
,
unable to coincide with its signified. For though it is difficult to pinpoint the residue
of meaning, it is still possible to conceptualize it as a something evermore about to be
and be done with it. Indeed, one of the dictionary definitions for
the word is precisely this: an object or entity not
precisely designated or capable of being designated. Nor does the difficulty lie in the way in which
thing is used as a
short-hand form to point to whatever is at issue. If it did, one could justly hope to
understand the poem by patiently thinking the interrelationships of the things the word
thing refers to. Indeed, one
could then follow the steps of Heidegger, who, in thinking the origin of the work of art,
complains about the rootlessness of Western thought of the thing and, after many detours, affirms that
The work lets the earth be an earth.{3}
|
3. |
As a versified Aurora Borealis,
the poem makes it a point to laugh at
all
things as nothing but a
Show
(7:2).
Reference is made only to be disclaimed, and after a world of references has been made, it
is flatly disavowed: "My Muse despises reference" (14:54). Reference, that is,
is displaced by self-reference. The difficulty, it seems, lies in the poem's
self-reference, in the self-negation of reference, in the self that thrives on reference
and
the negation of reference ("I'm not Oedipus" [13:12]), and in the narrative that
negates itself in the act of narration.
|
4. |
With the way back to England
foreclosed, and along with it the possibility of straying, the discouse in exile is
compelled to take wandering as its proper way of post-haste progression, shuttling between
narration and no narration, ground and no ground, place and no place, things and nothing.
And the without that precedes occasion is forced by the slanted
with
to retroactively
vacillate between not having and being against, making the sense of
opposition sound rather self-willed
and
half-hearted. The
doubling of meanings created by the slant, however, does not have the last
giggle.{4}
|
5. |
In creating disturbance in the without,
with
is split
within itself. Besides the orignal sense of having and the newly activated one of
being for, something else is
mobilized that seriously challenges the claim of having, the power of writing and, as if things were not complicated
enough, the authority of the author and his I. What does it mean, one may ask, to have an occasion against
(in the sense of in relation to or in response to) which one writes, sometimes
pro
and sometimes
con
?
And if we understand occasion as meaning circumstance, namely, an assembly or
gathering
of things, what does it mean to
have an occasion in and about which one writes posthaste, that is, without delay? A certain
circumspection is perhaps needed when one tries to write
about
things, when the
truth is that one is circumscribed, surrounded by them. Given that one is always more or
less surrounded by things, it may be questioned at what moment and in what manner things
emerge and manifest themselves as an occasion so that one can have or be had by it. In
other words, when and how do circumstances emerge, as if with the disruptiveness of an
event? Such questions are urgent in that, as Byron himself puts it elsewhere, also in
relation to the idea and the futility of opposition, Men are the sport of circumstances, when / The circumstances seem
the sport of men (5:15). It is no small matter that
men are the plaything of things.
|
6. |
But insofar as referentiality is disclaimed, it seems to matter little whether or not one is in the presence of a circumstance. What does is that something emerges of which only the uppermost gets written. It is perhaps an understatement to say emerge when uppermost suggests a depth out of which rise a throng of things, each contending with the other to come up on top, demanding writing. Pro or con, circumstance or no circumstance, something erupts, disrupts from an abyss, commanding an authority more imperative than imperiality (Monarchsare less imperative than rhymes [5:77]). In the anarchy of thoughts, the kings or the things called Sovereigns (9:60) are nothing. The lawless thoughts only obey the law of rhyme (The rhyme obliges me to this [5:77]). The I that writes is at the bottom obliged by what's uppermost. And where it dictates, friendship gives way to amour-propre, which, despite itself, takes not a little pleasure even in the fall of a friend. Like the other Romantics Byron develops a taste for the abyss, be it great Nature's or our own abyss / Of thought (14:1). Or the strange abyss of thoughts from which the sea-changed Shelley is raised, as if from the dead, only to be stationed near the shore, drooping like Narcissus to gather himself:
|
7. |
According to the drift of the
stanza, the sea is a dangerous place to practice the pyro-technics of
scepticism, for it
threatens to extinguish the fire, if not shorten the life, of the speculator. In the final
analysis, swimming, rather than navigation, is the art of giving oneself immoderately to
the sea and at the same time managing to retain one's
life. It is at once an unreserved giving and an insured preserving of one self. The thing
is to survive, to live on so that one can return, as Byron does, to hover on the brink.{5}
|
8.. |
And to swim long in the abyss of thought without drowning or tiring is to doubt or speculate and at the same time remain certain that [t]here's no such thing as certainty (9:17). But certainly, Shelley also returns from the abyss of thought, not stationed near the shore, but hovering between the with and without of circumstances. Shelley, for once, resurrects as the uppermost in the insurrection of thoughts, demanding and commanding writing, haunting Byron on the brink of the ninth canto of Don Juan . It seems then that, in addition to the question of what it means to have an occasion, there is also the question of what it means to own anabyss of thought, including that from which the metamorphosed Shelley returns, like a thing of air (16:23), raising questions about possession and self-possession.{6}
|
9. |
Moreover, it also gives rise to
questions concerning Byron's insistence on my way and his speculation on
My
chance to war
. . . with all who war / With thought (9:24). All
the questions boil down to this: what does it mean to use the possessive case, to what
extent the subject possesses or is possessed by the things that are said to be one's own? Such a question is particularly pressing when a poet's
mobility is at stake.
|
10. |
That Byron is a quintessential
poet, as
Don Juan
is a poem
par excellence
, of the thing has been confirmed
and consecrated by the critical tradition which, appropriating the authority of Byron
himself, focuses on a highly flattering notion of
mobilite
. Let one example suffice. As the editor of
Twentieth
Century Interpretations of
Don Juan:
A Collection of Critical Essays
, Edward
Bostetter observes that Byron
|
11. |
Moods vary as things change, but the subject of representation always remains spontaneously reflective, responding to and at the same time musing on his response to the scene of writing. The poet, in other words, is the master of his work, which in a specular play returns to him his image as a creator. Such oxymoronic formulation as spontaneous reflexivity -- or no less oxymoronic, reflexive spontaneity -- is very much in the grain of a well received concept of romanticism that posits self-reflexivity as its centerpiece. Under the sign of romantic irony, poetic consciousness is said to fold its creative energy and shaping power back on itself, on the one hand enabling the poetic consciousness to become self-consciousness -- or what amounts to the same thing, the subject to be present to itself -- and, on the other, demanding that literature write its owncriticism or even formulate its own theory, ab-solutely.{8}
|
12. |
It is dangerous, however, to talk
about romantic irony without irony. For, in so doing, one risks a naive fixation of a
fluid
process, be it (self-)consciousness or creativity. Moreover, in succumbing to the
seduction of the specular play, one is no longer able to distinguish between the
I as the subject of the
statement and as the subject of representation on the one hand, and between the subject
and his statement on the other. Indeed, it is the confusion of the two pairs that enables
Bostetter to talk about the mirroring of the poet and the poem in terms of possession,
while at the same time suppressing the fact that the possessive subject can be and, as in
Byron, is the possessed. To do justice to Byron, it is he himself that positions the
I between
within
and
without
,
thereby triggering the fluctuation between identity and multiplicity. Byron is evidently
playing with higher stakes. For, playing upon the disparity between temperate
and temper, the I is led through a series of
shifting contrasts culminating in the inside/outside opposition: I almost think that the same skin / For one without -- has two or
three within (17:11). Acted upon by internal and
external forces, the hedonist subject is driven beyond the pleasure principle to alternate
between hysterics and histrionics of a compulsive nature, elsewhere dramatized as a thing
called temperament and paradoxically attributed to the Popean Adeline:
|
13. |
As Byron defines it, mobilite is
an excessive susceptibility of immediate impressions -- at the same time without
losing
the
past; and is, though sometimes apparently useful to the possessor, a most painful and
unhappy attribute.{9} Though it is by no means
clear whether the displeasure is occasioned by the present impressions or triggered by the
past, or by the convergence of both,mobility gives rise not only to mixed feelings but
also to serious doubt concerning the agency of the subject, situated as it is in the play
of within and without, true and false, past and present, identity and multiplicity,
pleasure and pain, temperament and art, sincerity and theatricality, acting and being
acted on, being and seeming, thing and plaything. Perpetual agitation and eternal agility,{10}
it seems, are the two sides of the same coin made of irony.
|
14. |
But need it be said that it is
equally, if not more, dangerous to read irony, romantic or not, with irony? For one thing,
it is far from sure whether or not Byron retains his control in musing on his mobility
while giving it a free rein. In other words, to what extent is he in control in
owning
such mobility, in the double sense of possession and recognition of something alien and
alienating. One cannot but wonder what kind of stance it is to be knowingly possessed. On
the other hand, it is equally uncertain whether or not, in following the trajectory of the
thing from whats uppermost to what is nearest, one ends up
playing into the hand of the ironist, i.e., into the infinite regression of
self-referential statements. The statement I am an
ironist is perhaps as perplexing as the classical
paradox that inhabits the statement I lie. One simply is disoriented by the endless doubling whichever
way he turns in the hall of mirrors. As Paul de Man succintly puts it in an interview with
Robert Moynihan, irony is not a figure of
self-consciousness. It's a break, an interruption, a
disruption. It is a moment of loss of control, and not just for the author but for the
reader as well.{11} With irony, one enters
an uncertain ground.
|
15. |
However, if there is something diabolical and absurd about the statement Im possessed, the self-reflexivity is given a peculiar turn in the statement I'm possessed by that which possesses itself. To put it in a nutshell, it is the enigma of self-possession that puzzles the ironist. In addition to Shelley's coolness and self-possession, referred to earlier, there is the coldness or self-possession (15:57) of Aurora Raby, whose indifference / Confound[s] (15:83) not only Don Juan the puppet but also Lord Byron the puppeteer. She may very well be the prototype of Freud's narcissistic woman par excellence . As a cold and self-possessed young woman, she has nothing whatsoever in common with the warm-blooded Haidee, whose loss of control proves only too costly.
|
16. |
In his book on Byron's strength, Jerome Christensen makes romantic irony a strategic
issue with which he questions Jerome J. McGann, Marjorie Levinsonand, beyond them, the
critical tradition that reifies irony as a stylistic component of a no less reified
concept of romanticism. It is strategic in the sense that, as a point of attack, romantic
irony bears with it a perculiar absence or virtual presence. In one of the rare occasions
in which the term actually occurs, it is indicted and interdicted by a verbal echo of the
Popean authority: Romantic irony rushes in where
philosophes fear to tread.{12} Earlier on, he
displaces the term, in the double sense of whisking it onto the discussion of Byron's
Oriental tales, and
there
replacing it with a Lacanian formulation of the scopic
drive: This desire of the eye to see itself seeing
with no blind spots, with nothing behind it, is the formula for paranoia, for Romantic
irony, and for the Oriental tale, a
self-reflexive narrative with notes
(p. 98; emphasis added). The psychoanalytic underpinnings
notwithstanding, his reformulation of romantic irony parallels to a large extent the
above-mentioned work by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, who do not have recourse, as
Christensen does, to psychosis as the last refuge
against irony (p. 352).
|
17. |
The stragetic issue is what
McGann and Levinson respectively call Byron's
Romantic Irony and Byronic Irony. For
Christensen, there is no such thing as romantic irony, pure and simple, that in itself
guarantees what McGann calls the Juan effect, or that which can be recuperated,
as Levinson puts it, by
the biographical subject-form coded in all the poem.{13} In the light of Christensen's
poststructuralist biographical criticism (xxii), life and writing are radically disjuncted, so much so that
each can no longer be articulated in terms of the other without risking the reification of
the poetic form or, for that matter, the subject-form. And the question of the subject, if
it can be broached at all, is legitimate only if the poet is no longer the master strategist of his poem.
(p. 215). Byron is not to be given credit, despite his family motto Crede Byron
(p.
43), nor is he to be trusted, given his insistence, in his August 12, 1819 letter to John
Murray, that he have his own way with
Don Juan.
|
18. |
A basic assumption of my discussion is that reading Don Juan as a psychotic text is not necessarily incompatible with the way Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe would probably read it in terms of romantic irony, or even in terms of the fragment. Indeed, it can be argued that the textual operation of the fragment is largely responsible for the form in which the poem appears. By this, I do not mean the state in which the last canto was left unfinished at Byron's death, although it is also questionable whether he would have been able to finish it, had he lived on. Rather, what makes Don Juan a fragment of such a colossal stature is thecompulsive repetition of the endless digressions, the sudden turns and returns that twist and tear through the text on the one hand and fold the text back on itself on the other. The digressive and self-reflexive moments fragment the narrative, splitting the narrator along the way into the subject of the statement and the subject of representation. In both cases it is less a question of the narratorial persona than that of the narrator as a personification of that which articulates from the abyss. It is not the thing of and about which the subject speaks. Rather, it is the thing that speaks through and in (spite of) the subject. But to answer the question this way, without irony, is to have already missed the thing that calls for a persona or personae in the first place. For one thing, it is a paradox, if not bad faith, to give speech to that which makes speech possible. Furthermore, the dramaturgical metaphor presupposes that a clear distinction between the mask and the face behind it is possible, whereas it is precisely in the blurring of the two that that thing speaks. What readily comes to mind is the dramatics involved in the prosopopeia Jacques Lacan employs to articulate the Freudian thing via a Heideggerian discourse on the thing.{14}
|
19. |
Byron's insistence, in his August 12, 1819 letter to John Murray, that he
has his own way with
Don Juan
seems to negotiate a middle way between those
of Friedrich Schlegel and Jacques Lacan or, more specifically, between Transcendental and
psychoanalytic buffoonery.{15} For in the insistence of the letter, what is
own or proper is immediately
instanced by a reference to dramatic personae acting mad, and by an analogy with the kind
of performance that invokes the removal of constraints as the law of th genre and
associates the style of dress with that of address:
Where thoughts sway, writing takes all kinds of liberties to stray. But soon enough, both liberty and license give way to libertinism and licentiousness when buffoonery becomes a certain order of fooling .
|
20. |
It is easy to see how
Don Juan
,
as a
detour de force
, digresses along the itinerary of the thing which, in the
quick succession of appearances and disappearances, occasions the mobility that is Byron's
strength. It is not so easy, however, to outline the displacement of the Byronic thing.
Take Aurora Raby again for example. With her coldness and self-possession
(15:57), she's almost a
she-Shelley, whose indifference / Confound[s] (15:83) not only Don Juan the puppet of desire but also Lord
Byron the puppeteer. What is particularly seductive about the Byronic orphan's self-possession is that it gives rise to the fantasy of
self-identity, against which the self-division as objectified by Adeline's histrionic mobility is contrasted. If Adeline is where the
divided subject once was, Aurora Raby is where he would want to be, but somehow he ends up
fooling around with Lady Fitz-Fulke. The confusion of feminine positions is further
complicated when Aurora Raby is contrasted with Haidee, making it difficult to tell which
is the flower and which, the gem (15:58). Somewhere in the labyrinth of these and other
feminine positions the subject is lost. In light of this, the claim that Don Juan is
most things to all women (14:31)
sounds rather quizzical. Yet, it is of a piece with the Don Juan myth, which the Lacanian
psychoanalysis takes upon itself to perpetuate. In order to allow the Lacanian position to
come out in starker relief, it is necessary to let the Byronic thing play itself out and
to make clear what is supposedly Don Juan's way with
woman:
|
21. |
As with Adeline, to whom
histrionic mobility is transitivistically attributed, here, phantasies and imagination are
ascribed to all women with the certainty of a paranoid knowledge. Well, not exactly all,
but pretty close. Since in Aurora Raby the Byronic thing encounters an impasse, one has to
take her away from the set of all women, thus leaving it a set of all
but one. It may not have the appearance or
descriptive details of a catalogue, but it is perhaps as close as one can get to Leporello's list of
mille e tre donne
in Mozart's
Don Giovanni
. Elsewhere, Byron produces a list, not of
women's names, but of places where a man can
fool.
Although
Byron as a rule defends himself against the charge of bawdiness, he is more than willing
to own it in his October 26, 1819 letter to Douglass Kinnaird, demanding recognition from
the latter by force of rhetorical question coupled with sexual bravado characteristic of
the Don Juan tradition:
When art becomes autonomous, as far as the argument goes, contents dictate form, and formality gives way to liberty and license, which in turn give way soon enough to libertinism and licentiousness.
|
22. |
To sum up a bit, discursive
digression in
Don Juan
takes the form of self-reflexivity that is closely
associated with irony understood as permanent parabasis.{16} As such, they are also related to a
specific type of theatricality, namely, buffoonery. But, increasingly, buffoonery assumes
an aspect of seriality each time fooling veers towards digressions of a sexual nature.
Within the confines of the poem, the sexual is of course an effect of the textual,
precisely in the same way the I wanders from one to another place which is no place.
|
23. |
Of digression as a self-conscious buffoonery in Byron's Don Juan , one could almost say, as Francois Roustang does of Lacan's style of (ad)dress, that the form of his discourse was itself also subject to this double impression of being at once a rigorous sequence and an uninterrupted digression, and that his work resembles a vainglorious desperation in which the clown who thinks he is pulling the strings is merely redoubling the madness he had posited at the outset ashis first principle.{17} Theoretical equivocation is immediately translated into the theatrical, both in turn reduced to a problem of style. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen is much more specific and terse about the connection, calling Lacan a chameleon whose thought was as motley as his garb.{18} Theatricality seldom escapes the self-conscious individuals, be they poets, philosophers, or analysts, whose businesses require that they be vigilant with words. In fact, it is Lacan who sets the terms in characterizing himself as a perfect hysteric, and the best way, according to Stuart Schneiderman, to talk about a perfect hysteric is to do it theatrically . . . histrionically.{19} This is precisely what Borch-Jacobsen does before launching a philosophical critique of Lacan's psychoanalysis. The seductiveness of a hysteric, male or female, is something to reckon with, which he does by discrediting Lacan's achievement as an actor, in terms somewhat reminiscent of Kleist's marionette theater, Diderrot's theatrical Rameau, and even Byron's histrionic Adeline:
|
24. |
Borch-Jacobsen seeks to deflate, if not to purge, the psychoanalytic mode of theatricality. For Byron, however, theatricality is precisely the soul of his poem. In want of hero, Byron derives his Don Juan from a pantomime which, in turn, is derived from Thomas Shadwell's play The Libertine . {21} It is as if, in a discussion of Byronic digressions, one could not approach the subject except via a detour by addressing Lacan as a male hysteric and a marionette-like harlequin without, of course, the iconoclastic bite of either Roustang or Borsch-Jacobsen. But what about Lacan as a Don Juan? Again, I depend on Schneiderman's inside stories about Lacan's mistresses, who were almost as legion [as] his followers, about his running afoul of the matriarchy [of Marie Bonaparte and Anna Freud], about his tendency to expressing his amorous intentions toward women in flagrant ways and, above all, about how he fooled around with a woman in the back seat of a taxi cab. {22} If these stories were to be given credit, Sheila McDonald's distinction between public and private sides of the libertine--that is, between Byron as the narrator and Don Juan as the manipulated puppet--would lose a substantial part of its credibility, {23} the substance of libertinism being precisely its denial of the distinction between the public and the private or, what amounts to the same thing, making public the private. In terms of exhibitionism as a form of Selbstdarstellung , therefore, it is probably not accidental that, in the letter to Kinnaird, Byron explicitly asserts Don Juan as the life and the thing , and thereby associates the thing with the life of a man who fools around virtually everywhere except in his own bedroom (since, in Byron's case, to do so does not create scenes but scandals, the boudoir having always already been heavily patrolled by norms, sexual, contractual or legal).
|
25. |
In explicating Jacques Lacan's thought concerning Don Juan, Kiana Rabinovich highlights the compulsive nature of that type of masculine sexuality. What anguishes the Don Juan types is that they are captured by what Lacan calls an open set, the set of not-all women.{24} Women as not-all, i.e., as an open set, can be counted (as in the case with Leporello's list of mille e tre donne ), and the womanizers feel condemned to continue making this infinite enumeration of women, not only compulsively but also impulsively (Rabinovich, p. 87). Don Juan is a slave, and not just in the seraglio. Above all, the Don Juan types and prototypes are slaves to women's fantasy is that they are capable of responding to all feminine fantasies; consequently, they are especially docile in the way they adapt themselves to women's fantasies, one by one . . . , concerned with saying the words each woman wanted to hear and figuring out exactly how each woman wanted him to talk (p. 90). In Byronic language, the Don Juans are slaves, not because they are but because they want to be most things to all women. Their way with women is to begin by offering little more than a canvass with a tolerably fair outline, allowing them to fill in their imagination and phantasies. Strategically, it is called insinuating without insinuation (15:15); in terms of praxis, however, it may become mobilite in the sense of an excessive susceptibility to immediate impressions, etc.
|
26. |
I have deliberately juxtaposed
Byronic and Lacanian Don Juans in order to suggest the almost point for point
correspondences between them. If we remove Lacan's
technical innovations upon the formalistic and mathematical components of the libertine
tradition, the story or at least the outline of the story is vary much like that of Byron's. The point is, take Lacan's
mathemes and algorithms a way, you take away the soul of his
ecrits
. This is in a
sense what Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang, valuable as their works may be, have attempted in
taking away his theatricality as well as his algorithms, the soul of such writings being
its license, the formalization that works so hard to be incomprehensible. Roustang spells
out Lacan's affiliation with Surrealism, which he
thinks sought to go much further than German
Romanticism, and which he proposes to call hyperromanticism.{25}
German
Romanticism, for Roustang, is not altogether negative because insofar as it always maintained a certain distance between the relation to the
world of dreams and fantasy, order and rationality
are still viable. Addressing romanticism as this
repetitive compulsion, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy
speak of an exigency to guard against fascination and temptation, and call for some distance, some
vigilance and a minimum of lucidity.{26} Between
the romantics and their critics, there is a conflict of principles, not between pleasure
and reality principles, but between the pleasure principle and the beyond of the pleasure
principle. As such, it is more or less a formal question, that is, how can we maintain our
formal organization of the ego and its objects without succumbing to formal stagnation
and
paranoia that is bound to occur with it.{27} Given Lacan's famous hostility to the ego psychology, vigilance, rationality
and order are at best ineffective defense mechanisms. At their worst, according to
Schneiderman, they are themselves the apotheosis of
psychopathology (p. 16). Buffoonery is probably an
alter-native to madness.
|
Notes
|
Works Consulted |